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Abstract—This paper develops a novel framework for sharing
secret keys using the Automatic Repeat reQuest (ARQ) proto-
col. We first characterize the underlying information theoretic
limits, under different assumptions on the channel spatial and
temporal correlation function. Our analysis reveals a novel role
of “dumb antennas” in overcoming the negative impact of
spatial correlation on the achievable secrecy rates. We further
develop an adaptive rate allocation policy, which achieves higher
secrecy rates in temporally correlated channels, and explicit
constructions for ARQ secrecy coding that enjoy low imple-
mentation complexity. Building on this theoretical foundation,
we propose a unified framework for ARQ-based secrecy in Wi-
Fi networks. By exploiting the existing ARQ mechanism in
the IEEE 802.11 standard, we develop security overlays that
offer strong security guarantees at the expense of only minor
modifications in the medium access layer. Our numerical results
establish the achievability of non-zero secrecy rates even when
the eavesdropper channel is less noisy, on the average, than the
legitimate channel, while our linux-based prototype demonstrates
the efficiency of our ARQ overlays in mitigating all known,
passive and active, Wi-Fi attacks at the expense of a minimal
increase in the link setup time and a small loss in throughput.
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent flurry of interest on wireless physical layer
secrecy is inspired by Wyner’s pioneering work on the wiretap
channel [1] which establishes the achievability of perfectly
secure communication by hiding the message in the additional
noise level seen by the eavesdropper. More recently, the effect
of fading on the secrecy capacity was studied in which it was
shown that, by appropriately distributing the message across
different fading realizations, the multi-user diversity gain can
be harnessed to enhance the secrecy capacity, e.g. [2], [3].
Independent and parallel to our work, the authors of [4], [5],
[6] considered using the well-known Hybrid ARQ protocol
to facilitate the exchange of secure messages over fading
channels. One innovative aspect of our framework, compared
to [4], is the distribution of key bits over an asymptotically
large number of ARQ epochs. This approach allows for
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overcoming the secrecy outage phenomenon observed in [4]
at the expense of increased delay. Contrary to [6], we build an
information theoretic foundation for key sharing through ARQ
which inspires low complexity implementation of practical
coding schemes and reveals a novel role of dumb antennas in
overcoming the negative impact of spatial correlation, between
the legitimate and eavesdropper channels, on the achievable
key rate. Moreover, we propose a new greedy rate adaptation
algorithm that is capable of transforming the temporal corre-
lation in the legitimate channel into additional gains in the
secrecy rate.
Building on our information theoretic foundation, we de-
velop a unified ARQ security framework for Wi-Fi networks
(ARQ-seCuRity fOr Wireless Networks: ARQ-CROWN); an-
other distinguishing feature of our work as compared with [4],
[5], [6]. This framework is used to construct security overlays
which provide information theoretic confidentiality guarantees
to complement the underlying Wi-Fi security protocols. More
specifically, careful analysis of the state of the art attacks on
these protocols (e.g., [7], [8], [9]) reveals that they depend
critically on the availability of certain security parameters
as plaintext in the transmitted packets. By judiciously using
the available ARQ mechanism in the IEEE 802.11 standard,
our overlays transform those security parameters into a secret
key that is shared only by the legitimate nodes. Remarkably,
this goal is achieved through only minor modifications in the
MAC layer that treat all protocols uniformly, and hence, does
not entail additional network management tasks. The exper-
imental results, obtained from our Madwifi driver prototype,
demonstrate the ability of ARQ-CROWN to defend against
all known eavesdropping attacks (whether active or passive), at
the expense of a minor loss in throughput and a small increase
in link setup time. This, to the best of our knowledge, the
first attempt to demonstrate the utility of information theoretic
security concepts in practice.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We
develop our information theoretic foundation in Section II. The
design of our ARQ secrecy framework for Wi-Fi networks
is presented in Section III. Our numerical and experimental
results are given in Section IV. Section V offers some conclud-
ing remarks whereas the proofs are collected in the appendices
to enhance the flow of the paper.
II. INFORMATION THEORETIC FOUNDATION
A. System Model and Notations
Our model assumes one transmitter (Alice), one legitimate
receiver (Bob), and one passive eavesdropper (Eve). We adopt
a block fading model in which each channel is assumed to
be fixed over one coherence interval and changes from one
2interval to the next. In order to obtain rigorous information
theoretic results, we consider the scenario of asymptotically
large coherence intervals and allow for sharing the secret key
across an asymptotically large number of those intervals. The
finite delay case will be considered in Section II-D. In any
particular interval, the signals received by Bob and Eve are
respectively given by,
y(i, j) = gb(i)x(i, j) + wb(i, j),
z(i, j) = ge(i)x(i, j) + we(i, j),
where x(i, j) is the j th transmitted symbol in the i th block,
y(i, j) is the j th received symbol by Bob in the i th block,
z(i, j) is the j th received symbol by Eve in the i th block,
gb(i) and ge(i) are the complex block channel gains from
Alice to Bob and Eve, respectively. The channel gains can
also be written as gb(i) =
√
hb(i) exp(jθb(i)), and, ge(i) =√
he(i) exp(jθe(i)), where θb(i) and θe(i), the phase shifts at
Bob and Eve respectively, are assumed to be independent in
all considered scenarios. Moreover, wb(i, j) and we(i, j) are
the zero-mean, unit variance white complex Gaussian noise
coefficients at Bob and Eve, respectively. We do not assume
any prior knowledge about the channel state information at
Alice. Bob, however, is assumed to know gb(i) and Eve is
assumed to know both gb(i) and ge(i) a-priori. We impose
the following short-term average power constraint
E
(|x(i, j)|2) ≤ P¯ .
Our model only allows for one bit of ARQ feedback from Bob
to Alice. Each ARQ epoch is assumed to be contained in one
coherence interval (i.e., fixed channel gains) and that different
epochs correspond to different coherence intervals. The trans-
mitted packets are assumed to carry a perfect error detection
mechanism allowing Bob (and Eve) to determine whether the
packet has been received correctly or not. Bob sends back to
Alice an ACK/NACK bit, through a public feedback channel
which is only accessible by Bob but Monitored by Eve. To
minimize Bob’s receiver complexity, we adopt the memoryless
decoding assumption implying that frames received in error
are discarded and not used to aid in future decoding attempts.
Finally, Eve is assumed to be passive (i.e., can not transmit); an
assumption which can be justified in several practical settings.
We will argue in Section III, however, that our approach can
mitigate all known active attacks on Wi-Fi networks as well.
In our setup, Alice wishes to share a secret key W ∈ W =
{1, 2, · · · ,M} with Bob. To transmit this key, Alice and Bob
use an (M,m) code consisting of : 1) a stochastic encoder
fm(.) at Alice that maps the key w to a codeword xm ∈ Xm,
2) a decoding function φ: Ym →W which is used by Bob to
recover the key. The codeword is partitioned into a blocks,
each one corresponds to one ARQ-epoch and contains n1
symbols where m = a n1. Unless otherwise stated, we focus
on the asymptotic scenario where a → ∞ and n1 → ∞.
Alice starts with a random selection of the first block of n1
symbols. Upon reception, Bob attempts to decode this block.
If successful, it sends an ACK bit to Alice who moves ahead
and makes a random choice of the second n1 and sends it
to Bob. Here, Alice must make sure that the concatenation
of the two blocks belong to a valid codeword. As shown in
the sequel, this constraint is easily satisfied. If an error was
detected, then Bob sends a NACK bit to Alice; in which case
both Alice and Bob will discard this block. Alice will then
replace the first block of n1 symbols with another randomly
chosen block and transmits it. The process then repeats until
Alice and Bob agree on a sequence of a blocks, each of length
n1 symbols, corresponding to the key. It is interesting to note
that this strategy does not include any retransmissions. The
optimality of this approach, as proved in our main results,
hinges on this property which minimizes the information
leakage to Eve.
The code construction must allow for reliable decoding at
Bob while hiding the key from Eve. It is clear that the proposed
protocol exploits the error detection mechanism to make sure
that both Alice and Bob agree on the key (i.e., ensures reliable
decoding). What remains is the secrecy requirement which is
measured by the equivocation rate Re defined as the entropy
rate of the transmitted key conditioned on the intercepted
ACKs or NACKs and the channel outputs at Eve, i.e.,
Re
∆
=
1
n
H(W |Zn,Kb, Gbb, Gbe) ,
where n is the number of symbols transmitted to exchange
the key (including the symbols in the discarded blocks due to
decoding errors), b = a n
m
, Kb = {K(1), · · · ,K(b)} denotes
sequence of ACK/NACK bits, Gbb and Gbe are the sequences
of channel coefficients seen by Bob and Eve in the b blocks,
and Zn = {Z(1), · · · , Z(n)} denotes Eve’s channel outputs
in the n symbol intervals. We limit our attention to the perfect
secrecy scenario, which requires the equivocation rate Re to
be arbitrarily close to the key rate. The secrecy rate Rs is said
to be achievable if for any  > 0, there exists a sequence of
codes (2nRs ,m) such that for any m ≥ m(), we have Re =
1
n
H(W |Zn,Kb, Gbb, Gbe) ≥ Rs − , and the key rate for a
given input distribution is defined as the maximum achievable
perfect secrecy rate with this distribution.
B. Main Result
Our main result is derived for the scenario where the
feedback channel is error free and he, hb vary independently
from one block to another according to a joint distribution
f (hb, he). We will consider the effect of spatial and temporal
correlation in Section II-C. The following result characterizes
the Gaussian key rate under these assumptions.
Theorem 1: The key rate for the memoryless ARQ protocol
with Gaussian inputs is given by:
C(g)s = max
R0,P≤P¯
E
{[
R0 − log2 (1 + heP )
]+
I
(
R0 ≤ log2 (1 + hbP )
)}
,
(1)
for a fixed average power P ≤ P¯ and transmission rate
R0. [x]
+ = max(0, x) and I(x) = 1 if x is true and 0
otherwise. For the special case of spatially independent fading,
i.e. f (hb, he) = f(hb)f(he)) the above expression simplifies
to
C(i)s = max
R0,P≤P¯
{
Pr
(
R0 ≤ log2 (1 + hbP )
)
E
[
R0 − log2 (1 + heP )
]+}
.
(2)
3A few remarks are now in order.
1) It is clear from (1) that a positive secret key rate is
achievable under very mild conditions on the channels
experienced by Bob and Eve. More precisely, unlike
the approach proposed in [4], Theorem 1 establishes
the achievability of a positive perfect secrecy rate by
appropriately exploiting the ARQ feedback even when
Eve’s average SNR is higher than that of Bob.
2) Theorem 1 characterizes the fundamental limit on secret
key sharing and not message transmission. The differ-
ence between the two scenarios stems from the fact that
the message is known to Alice before starting the trans-
mission of the first block, whereas Alice and Bob can
defer the agreement on the key till the last successfully
decoded block. This observation was exploited by our
approach in making Eve’s observations of the frames
discarded by Bob, due to failure in decoding, useless.
3) It is intuitively pleasing that the secrecy key rate in
(2) is the product of the probability of success at
Bob and the expected value of the additional mutual
information gleaned by Bob, as compared to Eve, in
those successfully decoded frames.
4) The achievability of (1) hinges on a random binning
argument which only establishes the existence of a
coding scheme that achieves the desired rate. Our result,
however, stops short of explicitly finding such optimal
coding scheme and characterizing its encoding/decoding
complexity. This observation motivates the development
of the explicit secrecy coding schemes in Section II-D.
5) In the aforementioned security protocol, using a noisy
feedback channel will lead to mis-synchronization be-
tween Alice and Bob. This problem can be easily
overcome at the expense of a larger overhead in the
feedforward channel. Alice would include all the history
of received ACK/NACK in each frame. Once an ACK
is received, Alice will be assured that Bob has correctly
received the past history. Alice will then flush the
past history and will only include the recently received
ACK/NACK messages in future transmissions. Addi-
tionally, one may be tempted to assume that the noisy
feedback from Bob to Eve will allow for increasing
the secret key capacity. Unfortunately, Eve can easily
overcome the loss of ACK bits via an exhaustive trial
and error approach. More rigorously, since the ratio of
feedback bits over feedforward bits is vanishingly small,
the loss of ACK bits will not lead to an increase in the
equivocation at Eve.
C. Spatial and Temporal Correlation
One of the important insights revealed by Theorem 1 is the
negative relation between the achievable key rate and the spa-
tial correlation between the main and eavesdropper channels.
In fact, one can easily verify that the key rate collapses to zero
in the fully correlated case (i.e., hb = he with probability
one) independent of the marginal distribution of hb. In this
section, we propose a solution to this problem based on a novel
utilization of “dumb antennas.” The concept of dumb antennas
was introduced in [10] as a means to create artificial channel
fluctuations in slow fading environments. These fluctuations
are used to harness opportunistic performance gains in multi-
user cellular networks. As indicated by the name, one of the
attractive features of this approach is that the receiver(s) can be
oblivious to the presence of multiple transmit antennas [10].
We use dumb transmit antennas to de-correlate the main and
eavesdropper channels as follows. Alice is equipped with N
transmit antennas, whereas both Bob and Eve still have only
one receive antenna. In order to simplify the presentation, we
focus on the case of the symmetric fully correlated line of
sight channels; whereby the magnitudes of the channel gains
are all equal to one. The rest of our modeling assumptions
remain as detailed in Section II-A. The same data stream
is transmitted from the N transmitted after applying an i.i.d
uniform phase to each of the N signals. Also, Bob is assumed
to perturb its location in each ARQ frame resulting in a random
and independent phase shift (from that experienced by Eve).
Our multiple transmit antenna scenario, therefore, reduces to
a single antenna fading wiretap channel with the following
equivalent channel gains
geqb =
N∑
n=1
(
1√
N
exp(θiR + θiB)
)
,
geqe =
N∑
n=1
(
1√
N
exp(θiR + θiE)
)
,
where θiB , θiE , and θiR are i.i.d. and uniform over [−pi, pi]
that remain fixed over one ARQ frame and change randomly
from one ARQ frame to the next. One can now easily see that
as N increases, the marginal distribution of each equivalent
channel gain approaches a zero-mean complex Gaussian with
unit variance (by the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) [11]). It is
worth noting that the correlation coefficient between the two
channels’ equivalent power gains depends on the instantaneous
channels’ phases θiB’s and θiE ’s for i = 1, . . . , N . It can be
easily shown that, in the limit of N → ∞, this correlation
coefficient between the two channels power gains converges,
in a mean-square sense, to zero (please refer to Appendix B
for the proof). Therefore, in the asymptotic limit of a large
N , our dumb antennas approach has successfully transformed
our fully correlated line of sight channel into a symmetric
and spatially independent Rayleigh wiretap channel; whose
secrecy capacity (assuming Gaussian inputs) is reported in
Theorem 1. The numerical results reported in the sequel
(Section IV-A) demonstrate that this result is not limited to
line of sight channels, and that this asymptotic behavior can
be observed for a relatively small number of transmit antennas.
Thus far, we have assumed that the channel gains affecting
different frames are independent. This assumption renders
optimal the stationary rate allocation strategy of Theorem 1.
In this section, we relax this assumption by introducing
temporal correlation between the channel gains experienced
by successive frames. Assuming high temporal correlation,
if a stationary rate strategy is employed and it is less than
Eve’s channel capacity, all the information transmitted will be
leaked to Eve. On the other hand, if the rate is much less
than Bob’s channel capacity, additional gains in the secrecy
4capacity will not be harnessed. Hence, we are going to employ
a rate adaptation strategy in which the optimal rate used
in each frame is determined based on the past history of
ACK/NACK feedbacks and the rates used in previous blocks.
More specifically, following in the footsteps of [12], the
optimal rate allocation policy can be formulated as follows
(assuming a short term average power constraint P and a
Gaussian input distribution).
Rt = argmax
Rt
{(
Cs,t +
∞∑
k=t+1
Cs,k
)∣∣∣Rt−1,Kt−1
}
, (3)
where
Cs,t = Pr
(
Rt ≤ log2(1+hb,tP )
)
Ehe
[
Rt− log2(1+ heP )
]+
,
where Rt−1 = [R0, · · · , Rt−1] is the vector of previous
transmission rates and Kt−1 = [K0, · · · ,Kt−1] is the vector
of previously received ACKs and NACKs. The basic idea is
that, after frame (t − 1), the posteriori distribution of hb is
updated using Rt−1 and Kt−1. The expected secrecy rate, in
future transmissions, is then maximized based on this updated
distribution. It is worth noting that the above expression
assumes no spatial correlation between he and hb. This
assumption represents the worst case scenario since it prevents
Alice from learning the channel gains impairing Eve through
the ARQ feedback. Since the channel gain is not observed
directly, but through an indicator in the form of ARQ feedback,
the optimal rate assignment, when the channel is Markovian,
is a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP).
The solution of this POMDP is computationally intractable
except for trivial cases. This motivates the following greedy
rate allocation policy
Rt = argmax
Rt
{
Cs,t
∣∣∣Rt−1,Kt−1}.
Interestingly, the numerical results reported in Section IV-A
demonstrate the ability of this simple strategy to harness
significant performance gains in first order Markov channels.
Note that the performance of any rate allocation policy can
be upperbounded by the ergodic capacity with transmitter CSI
(and short term average power constraint P ), i.e.,
Cer = Ehe,hb
[
log2(1 + hbP )− log2(1 + heP )
]+
, (4)
which is achieved by the optimal rate allocation policy Rt =
log2(1 + hb,tP ). In fact, one can view the rate assignment
policy of (3) as an attempt to approach the rate of (4) by
using the ARQ feedback to obtain a better estimate of hb,t
after each fading block.
D. Explicit Coding Schemes
This section develops explicit secrecy coding schemes that
allow for sharing keys using the underlying memoryless ARQ
protocol with realizable encoding/decoding complexity and
delay. We proceed in three steps. The first step replaces the
random binning construction, used in the achievability proof
of Theorem 1, with an explicit coset coding scheme for
the erasure-wiretap channel. This erasure-wiretap channel is
created by the ACK/NACK feedback and accounts for the
computational complexity available to Eve. In the second
step, we limit the decoding delay by distributing the key
bits over only a finite number of ARQ frames. Finally, we
replace the capacity achieving Gaussian channel code with
practical coding schemes in the third step. Overall, our three-
step approach allows for a useful performance-vs-complexity
tradeoff.
The perfect secrecy requirement used in the information the-
oretic analysis does not impose any limits on Eve’s decoding
complexity. The idea now is to exploit the finite complexity
available at Eve in simplifying the secrecy coding scheme.
To illustrate the idea, let’s first assume that Eve can only
afford maximum likelihood (ML) decoding. Hence, successful
decoding at Eve is only possible when R0 ≤ log2(1+heP ), for
a given transmit power level P . Now, using the idealized error
detection mechanism, Eve will be able to identify and erase
the frames decoded in error resulting in an erasure wiretap
channel model. In practice, Eve may be able to go beyond
the performance of the ML decoder. For example, Eve can
generate a list of candidate codewords and then use the error
detection mechanism, or other means, to identify the correct
one. In our setup, we quantify the computational complexity
of Eve by the amount of side information Rc bits per channel
use offered to it by a Genie. With this side information, the
erasure probability at Eve is given by
 = Pr (R0 −Rc > log2(1 + heP )) , (5)
since now the channel has to supply only enough mutual
information to close the gap between the transmission rate
R0 and the side information Rc. The ML performance can be
obtained as a special case of (5) by setting Rc = 0.
It is now clear that using this idea we have transformed
our ARQ channel into an erasure-wiretap channel. In this
equivalent model, we have a noiseless link between Alice and
Bob, ensured by the idealized error detection algorithm, and an
erasure channel between Alice and Eve. The following result
characterizes the achievable performance over this channel.
Lemma 2: The secrecy capacity for the equivalent erasure-
wiretap channel is
Ce = max
R0,P≤P¯
{
R0E
[
I
(
(R0 ≤ log2(1 + hbP )
)
(R0 −Rc ≥ log2(1 + heP ))
)]}
= max
R0,P≤P¯
{
R0Pr
(
R0 ≤ log2(1 + hbP ),
R0 −Rc > log2(1 + heP )
)}
.
In the case of spatially independent channels, the above
expression reduces to
Ce = max
R0,P≤P¯
{
R0 Pr
(
R0 ≤ log2(1 + hbP )
)
Pr
(
R0 −Rc > log2(1 + heP )
)}
.
(6)
The proof follows from the classical result on the erasure-
wiretap channel [13]. It is intuitively appealing that the ex-
pression in (6) is simply the product of the transmission
rate per channel use, the probability of successful decoding
at Bob, and the probability of erasure at Eve. The main
5advantage of this equivalent model is that it lends itself to
the explicit coset LDPC coding scheme constructed in [14],
[15], [16]. In summary, our first low complexity construction
is a concatenated coding scheme where the outer code is
a coset LDPC for secrecy and the inner one is a capacity
achieving Gaussian code. The underlying memoryless ARQ
is used to create the erasure-wiretap channel matched to
this concatenated coding scheme.
The second step is to limit the decoding delay resulting
from the distribution of key bits over an asymptotically large
number of ARQ blocks in the previous approach. To avoid
this problem, we limit the number of ARQ frames used by
the key to a finite number k. The implication for this choice
is a non-vanishing value for the secrecy outage probability.
For example, if we encode the message as the syndrome of
the rate (k − 1)/k parity check code, Eve will be completely
blind about the key if at least one of the k ARQ frames is
erased [14], [15], [16] (Here the distilled key is the modulo-
2 sum of the key parts received correctly). The secrecy
outage probability, assuming spatially independent channels,
is therefore
Pout = Pr
(
min
j∈{1,...,k}
log2(1 + he(j)P ) > R0 −Rc
)
, (7)
where he(1),...,he(k) are i.i.d. random variables drawn accord-
ing to the marginal distribution of Eve’s channel. Assuming a
Rayleigh fading distribution, we get
Pout = exp
(
− k
P
[
2R0−Rc − 1]) . (8)
Under the same assumption, it is straightforward to see that the
average number of Bernoulli trials required to transfer k ARQ
frames successfully to Bob is given by N0 = k exp
(
2R0−1
P
)
,
resulting in a key rate
Rk =
R0
N0
=
R0
k
exp
(
−2
R0 − 1
P
)
. (9)
Therefore, for a given Rc and P , one can obtain a tradeoff
between Pout and Rk by varying R0. Our third, and final, step
is to relax the assumption of a capacity achieving inner code.
Section IV-A reports numerical results with practical coding
schemes, including uncoded transmission, with a finite frame
length n1. Overall, these results demonstrate the ability of the
proposed protocols to achieve near-optimal key rates, under
very mild assumptions, with realizable encoding/decoding
complexity and bounded delay that are of practical relevance.
In the next section, we introduce an ARQ-based secrecy
scheme for Wi-Fi networks that builds, in principle, on these
protocols.
III. ARQ SECURITY FOR WI-FI NETWORKS
A. Wi-Fi Security: The State of the Art
Before going into the details of our design, we provide
some necessary background about the existing Wi-Fi security
protocols. More specifically, we describe how “per-frame
keys” are generated and the critical dependence of all the
currently-known eavesdropping attacks on weaknesses in the
per-frame key generation mechanisms.
In general, the security functions of different Wi-Fi proto-
cols could be separated into three layers, namely, an authenti-
cation layer, an access control layer and a WLAN layer [17].
In this paper, we focus only on the processes involved with
encrypting and decrypting frames, that are found in the
WLAN layer solely (the Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP),
the Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP), and the Counter
Mode with Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication
Code Protocol (CCMP) standards). The reader is referred
to [17] for details on the other two layers. We refer to the
overall processes of sending and receiving frames securely as
encapsulation and decapsulation, respectively. Those processes
fall within WEP, TKIP (in WPA or WPA2) and CCMP (in
WPA2). Figure 1 shows two abstract schematic diagrams of
frame encapsulation and decapsulation which will be useful in
describing the integration of the ARQ-CROWN overlay with
each of these protocols.
1) Security at the WLAN Layer: The encapsulation process
starts by what we refer to as “security parameters generation”,
which is the first block in Figure 1(a). The sole function of
those generated parameters is to ensure the use of a fresh
key for each frame. In the WEP protocol, a 24-bit value,
called the Initialization Vector (IV), is generated in this step.
TKIP generates a similar 48-bit value, called TKIP Sequence
Counter (TSC), while CCMP generates the Packet Number
(PN), of length 48 bits as well.
The WEP protocol does not specify how the IV should be
generated, although it recommends that the IV value should be
different for each frame [18]. In TKIP and CCMP, both the
TSC or the PN are initialized by an agreed-upon value and
are incremented by one for each new frame. There are two
basic reasons for incrementing the TSC (or PN) versus using
a random value. First, to ensure covering the entire sequence
space. Second, and more importantly, to defend against replay
attacks, as will be illustrated shortly. Since those parameters
will be needed for decapsulation at the receiver, they are sent,
in-the-clear, in a special security header (Hs) that is inserted
between the frame’s MAC header and the encrypted message.
The remainder of the encapsulation process involves frame key
generation (this is where the security parameters are combined
with some secret root key, Ks, to obtain a key for a specific
frame), encryption, adding an Integrity Check Value (ICV) and
possibly a Message Integrity Check (MIC) value. We refer the
reader to [17] for a comprehensive study on each of those
steps.
At the receiver side (Figure 1(b)), the security parameters
are extracted from the security header. The WEP protocol does
not perform any checks on this value and directly proceeds to
the next steps. However, for TKIP and CCMP, once the TSC
(or the PN) is extracted from the security header, a check
is performed. If the recovered TSC (PN) is less than the
last received TSC (PN), the frame is considered a replayed
version of a previous frame and is discarded. Subsequent
decapsulation processes include decryption and ICV and MIC
tests. Those tests serve as means to ensure that the frame
has been decrypted correctly and has not been maliciously
tampered with. For the purpose of this paper, we use the
symbol V to refer to WEP’s IV, TKIP’s TSC or CCMP’s PN.
6(a) The encapsulation process. (b) The decapsulation process.
Fig. 1: WLAN-layer security functions. For a given frame, M is the plaintext, C is the ciphertext, and F is the transmitted
packet. HMAC and Hs denote the MAC and security headers for that frame, respectively.
2) Wi-Fi Security Attacks: Borisov, Goldberg, and Wagner
first reported WEP design failures in [18]. They showed that
the ICV test fails to detect malicious attacks and that IV reuse
allows for packet injection. Later, the first key recovery attack
against WEP (the FMS attack) was presented by Fluhrer,
Mantin and Shamir [19] using some weaknesses of the RC4
Key Scheduling Algorithm. They also showed the recovery of
the WEP key becomes much easier if some IVs that satisfy
certain properties (weak IVs) were used. The KoreK chopchop
attack attempted at breaking WEP using the CRC32 checksum
(the ICV test) [20]. KoreK also presented another group of
attacks that do not rely on weak IVs [21]. A rather efficient
iterative algorithm that recovers the WEP key was proposed
by Klein in [22]. On the other hand, the Bittau attack made
use of the fragmentation support of IEEE 802.11 to break
WEP [23]. Finally, Pyshkin, Tews, and Weinmann presented
more enhancements to the Klein attack by using ranking
techniques [7]. At the moment, this recent attack is considered
to be the most powerful attack against WEP.
Statistical WEP attacks, e.g. [19], could, in principle, use
only passive eavesdropping in order to collect a large number
of frames with known IVs. However, they often use injection
or replay techniques to shorten the listening time. For example,
an attacker might continuously replay captured ARP (Address
Resolution Protocol) request packets. Consequently, the Ac-
cess Point (AP) will begin to broadcast those ARP request
packets, and IVs will be generated at a higher rate. Other
WEP attacks do not need a large number of IVs. Instead, they
rely on injection, e.g., [20] or [23].
In 2004, weaknesses in the temporal key hash of TKIP were
shown [24]. An attacker could use the knowledge of a few
keystreams and TSCs to predict the Temporal Key and the
MIC Key used in TKIP. Later in 2008, Tews and Beck [25]
made the first practical attack against TKIP. In a chopchop-like
manner, an attacker can recover the plaintext of a short packet
and falsify it within about 12-15 minutes, in a WPA network
that supports IEEE802.11e QoS features. In 2009, a practical
falsification attack against TKIP was proposed [8], in which
the Beck-Tews attack was applied to a man-in-the-middle
attack to target any WPA network. The latter attack takes
about one minute. CCMP arguably provides robust security.
However, a weakness in the nonce construction mechanism
in CCMP was recently discovered [9]. A predictable PN in
CCMP was shown to decrease the effective encryption key
length from 128 bits to 85 bits [9].
In summary, the previously mentioned attacks rely on
collecting a large number of ciphertext along with the cor-
responding security parameters which are sent in-the-clear,
whether through passive eavesdropping or innovative active
techniques. As detailed in the following section, the ARQ-
CROWN overlay solves this problem by exploiting the oppor-
tunistic secrecy principle resulting from the wireless multipath
fading environments.
B. ARQ-CROWN: An Overview
ARQ-CROWN is designed for Wi-Fi networks operating
in infrastructure mode that may use any of the IEEE802.11
security protocols, i.e., WEP, TKIP or CCMP for encryption.
The network is composed of one AP and L clients, in the
presence of one attacker. The AP and all clients follow the
ARQ mechanism adopted in the IEEE 802.11 standard, i.e., for
each transmitted frame, the receiver acknowledges the receipt
of that frame through a short ACK message. We assume
disabled retransmissions, i.e., if a timeout event occurs at the
transmitter (the data frame or the ACK message were lost),
it simply discards the current frame and moves to further
transmissions1.
Key management and re-keying policies are aspects that fall
outside the scope of this paper. For this reason, we assume
that once a wireless client is authenticated and has gained
access to the network, it shares root keys with the AP. From
1The analysis provided in this paper could be easily extended to the case
of enabled retransmissions.
7(a) The encapsulation process. (b) The decapsulation process.
Fig. 2: WLAN-layer security functions incorporating the ARQ-CROWN overlay. The shaded blocks represent ARQ-CROWN
modifications
the simplest setting of one-key-for-all in the WEP protocol,
to a rather complicated key hierarchy in WPA and WPA2,
our discussion would be on a per-frame basis. Hence, we
assume that, for each frame, the client and the AP agree
on which key is used to encapsulate/decapsulate this frame.
Throughout the sequel, this secret key is referred to as Ks.
In the proposed ARQ-CROWN overlay, we transform the
V values of different frames into additional private keys
that are shared among the legitimate nodes. ARQ-CROWN
entirely focuses on the V value of each frame, leaving the
secret root key, Ks, unaltered. Figure 2 shows the modified
WLAN layer when overlaid by ARQ-CROWN. The figure
shows three new separate modules that run independently from
the encapsulation and decapsulation processes; namely, an
initialization module, an ACK/Timeout detection module and
a group update module. Those modules interact solely with the
security parameters generation and extraction blocks that are
modified to incorporate ARQ security. Outputs of those steps
are fed to the remaining functional blocks of encapsulation
and decapsulation, which remain exactly the same as in the
original standards. For ease of presentation, we begin by using
a simple three-node network model. In this network, Alice
corresponds to one legitimate client, Bob corresponds to the
AP and Eve is a malicious attacker. We later show how to
extend our scheme to secure multicast flows.
The initialization module works on letting Alice and Bob
agree on an initial value, V0, that will be later used in securing
unicast flows in the Alice-Bob and Bob-Alice directions. It
runs, only once, after Alice is associated and authenticated and
before data ports are open. In essence, the process is similar to
the one described in Section II-A but with some modifications
that better utilize the MAC layer of the IEEE 802.11 standard
and that take into account dealing with an active eavesdropper,
as will be clear with further discussion. Once this initialization
phase is complete, secure data communication is allowed.
The ACK/Timeout detection module runs during open data
sessions. It works on deciding on the status of each transmitted
Fig. 3: The ARQ-CROWN initialization phase.
unicast frame, which is referred to as Q. This status helps
both Alice and Bob update the V values for the unicast
frames they exchange, for each transmitted frame. Finally, the
group update module allows for securing multicast data. In
the following section, we show how each of those modules
operate and rigorously analyze their security.
C. ARQ-CROWN: Operation and Security Analysis
1) The Initialization Phase: The initialization phase works
as illustrated in Figure 3. First, Alice transmits an initialization
frame, carrying a sequence number 1 and random number R1,
and starts a timer. Once Bob receives this frame, he replies
with another initialization frame, carrying a sequence number
2, and another random number R2. If Alice receives this frame
before a timeout event occurs, she stores the pair (R1, R2)
for later use, and transmits another initialization frame with
sequence number 3 and a new random number R3. Otherwise
8(a timeout event occurs), Alice discards R1, and transmits
another initialization frame with sequence number 1 and a
new random number R3. The process continues till Alice
has stored n initialization random values. On the other side,
Bob keeps on responding to each initialization frame he gets
with a sequence number incremented by one, and a newly
generated random number. However, he stores only the last
pair it has for any given sequence number. The length of each
transmitted random number is 24 bits if WEP is used, or 48
bits otherwise. Finally, the initial value, V0, is the modulo-
2 sum of the random number pairs successfully received by
both Alice and Bob.
The security of this protocol in the presence of a passive
Eve directly builds on the results provided in Section II-D.
More specifically, as Eve becomes completely blind about V0
if she misses one of the values constituting V0, the probability
of secrecy outage in our case (corresponding to (7)) is
P0 =
∏
i∈A
(1− γAEi)
∏
j∈B
(1 − γBEj ), (10)
where A and B are the sets of time indices that corre-
spond to the frames stored by Alice and Bob, respectively.
γAE1 , . . . , γAEn−1 denote the frame loss probabilities in the
Alice-Eve channel whereas γBE2 , . . . , γBEn denote the frame
loss probabilities in the Bob-Eve channel. All of those proba-
bilities are random variables that are independently and iden-
tically distributed according to Eve’s channels’ distributions.
Since the size of each of A and B is n/2. It is evident that, as
n increases, P0 decreases and we achieve better security gains,
at the expense of a larger delay in the initialization phase.
On the other hand, if Eve is active, she will be capable of
injecting or replaying initialization frames, since they are not
encrypted. However, any injection or replay attempt will cause
a disagreement between Alice and Bob on V0. We will later
show that if Alice and Bob do not agree on V0, they will not
be able to exchange any data frames. Consequently, a replay
or injection attack directly corresponds to a Denial of Service
(DoS) attack. We finally note that in the case of using the WEP
protocol, the initialization frames, being un-encrypted, reveal
no information about the secret key, Ks, and thus cannot be
used in any statistical WEP attack.
2) Securing Unicast Data: Right after initialization, our
protocol works on updating the V values, used to encapsulate
each unicast data frame sent on the Alice-Bob and Bob-Alice
channels. To illustrate, first consider the ith data frame to
be securely transmitted, using any security protocol, from
Alice to Bob. Alice starts by generating a random number
(of length 24 if WEP is used, or 48 bits otherwise) referred to
as the header-V, Vh(i). The ARQ-CROWN protocol must not
use two consecutive equal header-V’s. This property will be
shown to be useful for defending against replay attacks. This
value, Vh(i), is put in the frame’s security header, according
to the specifications of the security protocol used. However,
unlike the standards, the value used by ARQ-CROWN in
encapsulating the frame, denoted by Ve(i), is the modulo-2
sum of the current header-V, Vh(i), and all of the header-V’s
previously transmitted by Alice and successfully received by
Bob. The update equation for Ve is then
Ve(i) =
{
Vh(i)
⊕
Ve(i − 1), if Q(i− 1) = 1,
Vh(i)
⊕
Ve(i − 1)
⊕
Vh(i− 1), otherwise,
(11)
where Q(i) = 1 if Alice received an ACK for the ith
transmitted frame, Q(i) = 0 otherwise. This status is obtained
through the ACK/Timeout detection module running at Alice
(Figure 2(a)). The initial value for this algorithm is set by the
agreed-upon V0 of the initialization phase, i.e., Ve(0) = V0,
while Vh(0) = 0. Similarly, when Bob receives the ith frame,
he first extracts Vh(i) from the security header, and then
performs a check. If Vh(i) = Vh(i − 1), Bob discards the
frame and treats it as a sign of a replay attack. If not, Bob
attempts to decapsulate the frame with Vd(i),
Vd(i) = Vh(i)
⊕
Vd(i − 1), (12)
where Vd(0) = V0. If decryption fails (an ICV failure occurs),
this would be due to an erasure of the (i − 1)th ACK. Bob
then goes through another decryption attempt, after excluding
Vh(i − 1) from the sum, i.e., with Vd(i) = Vh(i)
⊕
Vd(i −
1)
⊕
Vh(i − 1). Another failure in decryption is treated as a
sign of an attack and countermeasures could be invoked (the
reason behind this will become clear in the security analysis
to follow). Following this protocol, Alice and Bob perfectly
agree on the V values used for each frame. We avoid any
mis-synchronization that could happen due to the loss of an
ACK frame; without any additional feedback bits (as opposed
to Section II-B). The unicast flow from Bob to Alice could be
secured in the same manner illustrated above.
We now analyze the security of this phase. In our scheme,
the collected traffic by a passive Eve becomes useful for any
attack depending on Eve’s ability to correctly compute Ve
for each captured frame. To achieve this, Eve first has to
correctly compute V0, in the initialization phase between Alice
and Bob. This happens with probability P0 (as given in (10)).
Afterwards, for each captured frame, Eve has to keep track of
all the previously acknowledged data frames preceding that
frame. Eve becomes, again, completely blind if she misses
a single acknowledged frame. Based on this observation, we
let u denote the total number of data frames that Eve can
correctly compute their Ve, i.e., the useful frames for Eve. If
γAE = γAB = γE for all time indices, the expected number
of such frames is upper-bounded by
E[u] ≤ E[γ´E ]
n+1 − E[γ´E ]N+1
E[γE ]
, (13)
where γ´E = 1 − γE , n is the total number of initialization
frames constituting V0 and N is the unicast data session size.
As shown in Eq. (13), a slight increase of the number of
initialization frames results in a significant decrease in the
number of useful frames for Eve in each session. This has a
direct impact on the feasibility of many attacks, especially
the statistical WEP attacks, e..g. [19], as those depend on
collecting a large number of IVs (Ve’s in the ARQ-CROWN
case) to run efficiently.
We now consider the case of an active Eve. For the unicast
flow from Alice to Bob, Eve could use Alice’s MAC address
to inject or replay data frames of her choice, or use Bob’s
9MAC address to inject ACK messages to confuse Alice.
However, any injected or replayed frame will lead to mis-
synchronization between Alice and Bob. This will be detected
by Bob through two successive ICV failures. As we already
mentioned, Bob would treat this as a sign of an attack
and countermeasures could follow. The most straightforward
countermeasure is to change the keys of the whole network or
of the attacked sessions. Still, the history of V values built up
thus far could be used after invoking countermeasures through
fast means of “re-synchronization” as will be later discussed.
Frame interception (jamming), in general, is often used
as part of phishing and MITM attacks. Additionally, when
ARQ-CROWN is deployed, interception could be used to
delay the key update process for a certain data flow in the
network. Defending against those attacks requires additional
modifications, which are outlined in Section III-D.
3) Securing Multicast Traffic: Thus far, our discussion was
limited to unicast sessions. Since multicast frames are not
ACKed, the previously demonstrated scheme cannot be used
to secure these frames. Our scheme for multicast traffic goes
as follows: Whenever a client subscribes to a multicast group,
g, the AP sends a new random value, Vg , to every associated
client that belongs to this group along with an ID for this
Vg value (the updates can be periodic or triggered based on
group membership changes). Those values are transmitted to
each client over its secure pairwise link with the AP, i.e., as
encrypted frames. Once the AP makes sure that all clients
in the group have received Vg , through individual ACKs,
the AP uses this value to compute Veg , that will be used
for encapsulating each upcoming multicast frame, within this
group, i.e.,
Veg (i) = Vh(i)
⊕
Vg. (14)
where Vh(i) is a random header-V as illustrated before. Vh(i)
and the ID of the used Vg are sent in the security header of
the multicast frame. Similarly, for members of a particular
multicast group g, a client uses the recovered information
from the security header to compute Vdg (i) and decapsulate
any multicast frame addressed to this group. Any failure in
decryption (ICV test failure) is treated as a sign of attack.
Finally, in order to defend against replay attacks, the AP
should not use repeated Vh values within the lifetime of a
certain Vg . Similarly, whenever a client receives a multicast
frame, it must check for this condition and treat repeated Vh’s
as a sign of attack.
Using this ARQ-CROWN multicast overlay, a passive Eve
cannot make use of any of the multicast frames, as secure
pairwise links are used to incorporate hidden and periodically-
updated values into multicast Ve’s. On the other hand, an
active Eve is not capable of injecting or replaying any of the
multicast frames, as any replay or injection attempt would lead
to a decryption failure at the legitimate recipients. Finally, for
WPA and WPA2, since there is a different group key for each
multicast group and that is updated with group membership
changes, our proposed multicast approach fits nicely within
their framework and increases their security. For the WEP
case, which uses a shared key for all multicast groups, our
group-V updates add a natural way for group membership
handling. This gives an additional security advantage for the
WEP case, without having to change the secret root key, Ks.
D. Discussion
The enhanced security, offered by our scheme, is mostly
evident in the case of WEP. In particular, using the ARQ-
CROWN overlay, any statistical WEP attack would require
a substantially longer listening time before launching the
attack; which makes such attacks virtually impossible. This is
demonstrated by the experimental results of Section IV-B. It is
worth nothing that in order for Eve to have a potential use of
any unicast session, she has to be present from the beginning of
this session. Also, our analytical estimate of the lower bound
on the number of useful frames for Eve (Eq. (10)) implicitly
assumes that Eve is totally capable of tracking ACKs, i.e., she
perfectly knows the status of each unicast frames. In practice,
especially in large networks where channel conditions could be
relatively worse, such knowledge is not perfect which causes
more confusion at Eve’s side.
One can envision several enhancements for the basic im-
plementation presented here. First, setting the timeout pe-
riods in the ARQ-CROWN initialization phase should be
carefully designed so as to defend against MITM attacks
and at the same time keep the initialization delay within a
practically acceptable range. A related point is to analyze
the ACK/timeout events at the legitimate senders to detect
anomalies in the behavior of the connected nodes for better
detection of frame interception (jamming). Second, in order to
reduce the overhead of the initialization phase, the legitimate
nodes can use the current history for future sessions. Upon
disassociation, the AP and any legitimate client can store the
last point in their ARQ-history, and build up on it in newer
sessions instead of going through new initialization phases.
This way, the additional link setup delay imposed by the ARQ-
CROWN overlay is minimized and security is enhanced at the
expense of additional negligible memory at both sides. This is
especially useful for designing seamless handoff mechanisms
for Wi-Fi networks as this information can be transferred
to the new AP using the IEEE 802.11f protocol. Finally,
through small modifications, the ARQ-CROWN overlay could
be further extended to secure the secret root keys to provide
more security. The ARQ-CROWN overlay could also be used
for security at layers higher than the MAC layer, using the
same underlying principles.
IV. NUMERICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Numerical Results
Throughout this part, we focus on the symmetric scenario
where E (hb) = E (he) = 1. We further assume Rayleigh
fading channels, for both Bob and Eve. Assuming spatially
and temporally independent channels, the achievable secrecy
rate in (2) becomes
Cs = max
R0
exp
(
−2
R0 − 1
P
)
{
R0 − exp (1/P )
loge (2)
[
Ei (1/P )− Ei
(
2R0/P
)]}
,
(15)
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Fig. 5: The key rates using N dumb antennas, assuming
fully correlated exponential channel gains.
where Ei (x) =
∫∞
x
exp (−t) /t dt. Figure 4 gives the varia-
tion of Cs and Ce (as given in (6)) with SNR under different
constraints on the decoding capabilities of Eve, captured by
the genie-given side information, Rc. It is clear from the figure
that Ce can be greater than Cs for certain Rc and SNR values.
For instance, in the case of Rc = 0, a packet received in error
at Eve will be discarded without any further attempts at
decoding. Therefore, the secrecy rate becomes R0, which is
larger than that used in (2); Cs(i) = R0 − log2(1 + he(i)P ),
where Cs(i), he(i) are the instantaneous secrecy rate, and
Eve’s channel power gain, respectively. Averaging over all
fading realizations, we get a greater Ce than Cs. It is worth
noting that, under the assumptions of the symmetric scenario
and the Rayleigh fading model, the scheme proposed in [4] is
not able to achieve any positive secrecy rate (i.e., probability
of secrecy outage is one). The role of dumb antennas in
increasing the secrecy capacity of spatially correlated ARQ
channels is investigated next. In our simulations, we assume
that the channel gains are fully correlated, but the channel
phases are independent. The independence assumption for the
phases is justified as a small change in distance between Bob
and Eve in the order of several electromagnetic wavelengths
translates to a significant change in phase. Under these as-
sumptions, it is easy to see that with one transmit antenna
the secrecy capacity is zero. In Figure 5, it is shown that
as the number of antennas N increases, the secret key rate
approaches the upper bound given by (2), which assumes
that the main and eavesdropper channels are independent. The
same trend is observed assuming chi-square distribution with
different degrees of freedom (the figures were omitted to avoid
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Fig. 7: The key rates required to obtain an outage of 10−10
against SNR for different packet sizes, Kb = 240 and 480
bits, and different modulation schemes.
redundancy). Figure 6 reports the performance of the greedy
rate adaptation algorithm for temporally correlated channels.
The channel is assumed to follow a first order Markov model:
g(t) = (1 − α)g(t− 1) +
√
2α− α2w(t)
where w(t) is the innovation process following CN (0, 1)
distribution. As expected, it is shown that as α decreases,
the key rate increases. For the extreme points when α = 0
or α = 1, we get an upper bound, which is the ergodic
secrecy under the main-channel transmit CSI assumption, and
a lower bound, which is the ARQ secrecy capacity in case of
independent block fading channel, respectively.
Finally, we turn our attention to the delay-limited coding
constructions proposed in Section II-D. In Figure 7, we relax
the optimal channel coding assumption and plot key rates
for practical coding schemes and finite frame lengthes (i.e.,
finite n1). The code used in the simulation is a punctured
convolutional code derived from a basic 1/2 code with a
constraint length of 7 and generator polynomials 133 and
171 (in octal). We assume that Eve is genie-aided and can
correct an additional 50 erroneous symbols (beyond the error
correction capability of the channel code). Note that the
transmission rate is fixed and is independent of the SNR.
Therefore, a low SNR means more transmissions to Bob and a
consequent low key rate. As the SNR increases, while keeping
the transmission rate fixed, the key rate increases. However,
increasing the SNR also means an increased ability of Eve to
correctly decode the codeword-carrying packets. This explains
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Fig. 8: The average number of useful frames at Eve.
why the key rate curves a peak and then decays with SNR. We
also observe that, for a certain modulation and channel coding
scheme, reducing the packet size increases the probability of
correct decoding by Bob and, thus, decreases the number of
transmissions. However, it also increases the probability of
correct decoding by Eve and the overall effect is a decreased
key rate.
B. Experimental Results
Our experiments are conducted with a modified version of
the Madwifi driver that has ARQ-CROWN capabilities. All
of our testbed nodes are Dell Latitude D830 laptops that
are equipped with Atheros-based D-Link DWL-G650 WLAN
cards. All traffic is generated using Netperf [26].
1) Security: One-way traffic was generated between a client
node (Alice) and the AP (Bob) in the presence of one
eavesdropper (Eve). Eve’s driver was equipped with the ARQ-
CROWN algorithms, i.e. Eve calculates Ve for each frame
based on the captured traffic. Two experiments were launched
in different environments. In the first experiment, Eve had
relatively better channel conditions, as compared to Bob, while
in the second, the situation was reversed. We compared the
Ve values that Eve and Bob obtained for each frame, and
calculated the number of useful frames for Eve (with different
numbers of initialization frames).
The results are reported in log scale in Figure 8. For both
experiments, the data session size is taken to be 100000
frames. The large disagreement between the analytical esti-
mates (evaluated as given in 13) and the experimental results
in Figure 8(b) is due to the very small average number (up
to 10−20) of useful frames when the channel conditions are
against Eve, which requires an infeasible experiment duration
to be captured in practice. These results can be used to estimate
the required time for Eve to capture a total of 1.5 million useful
frames that is typically required to launch a combined form
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Fig. 9: Network throughput for TCP flows with different
security protocols.
of the FMS and KoreK attacks ( [27]). Under the original
WEP operation, we assume that Eve needs 10 minutes to
gather such traffic using passive eavesdropping only. Based on
this estimate, using ARQ-WEP protocol extends the required
average listening time for Eve to 1.24 years and 5.07 years,
for the first and second experiments, respectively, using only
an initialization overhead of 0.001. Note that under ARQ-
CROWN operation, Eve cannot use any active techniques to
reduce the listening time. For TKIP and CCMP, the decreased
number of useful frames at Eve hampers her ability to exploit
the weaknesses that were discussed in Section III-A2.
2) Throughput: Here we compare the performance of the
proposed ARQ-CROWN overlay with the baseline software
implementations of WEP, TKIP, and CCMP in the Madwifi
driver. To obtain a measure of performance if the proposed
ARQ-CROWN overlay was implemented in hardware, we also
include the results of all hardware implementations. Figure 9
reports the aggregate network throughput for TCP flows, with
different packet sizes, for WEP, TKIP, and CCMP. One can
see that using the ARQ-CROWN on top of WEP (ARQ-
WEP) results in a throughput degradation of 11.57% over the
Madwifi software implementation of WEP (SW-WEP), for a
packet size of 1500 bytes. The corresponding degradation for
TKIP and CCMP is 15.61% and 15.26%, respectively. This
quantifies the processing overhead of ARQ-CROWN operation
(as described in Section III-C2). As the packet size increases,
the overhead introduced by the ARQ-CROWN decreases, as
it is amortized over a larger packet size.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper developed a unified framework for sharing secret
keys using existing ARQ protocols. The underlying idea is to
distribute the key bits over multiple ARQ frames and then use
the authenticated ACK/NACK feedback to create an equiva-
lent degraded channel at the eavesdropper. Our information
theoretic foundations established the achievability of non-zero
secrecy rates even when the eavesdropper is experiencing a
higher average SNR than the legitimate receiver and shed light
on the structure of optimal ARQ secrecy protocols. It is worth
noting that our approach does not assume any prior knowledge
about the instantaneous CSI; only prior knowledge of the aver-
age SNRs seen by the eavesdropper and the legitimate receiver
are needed. Our secrecy capacity characterization revealed the
negative impact of spatial correlation and the positive impact
of temporal correlation on the achievable key rates. The former
phenomenon was mitigated via a novel “dumb antennas”
technique, whereas the latter was exploited via a greedy
rate adaptation policy. Furthermore, low complexity secrecy
coding schemes were constructed by transforming our channel
to an erasure wiretap channel which lends itself to explicit
coset coding approaches. Building on this solid foundation,
we developed a novel approach for ARQ security in Wi-Fi
networks (i.e., ARQ-CROWN). Our ARQ-CROWN overlay is
shown to offer provable information theoretic confidentiality
guarantees which complement the security measures provided
by the underlying WEP, WPA, and WPA2 protocols. These
claims were validated by experimental results, obtained from
our prototype, which illustrate the ability of ARQ-CROWN to
mitigate all known eavesdropping attacks, whether active or
passive, at the expense of a throughput loss in the order of
10%–15% using software encryption.
The most interesting part of our work is, perhaps, the
demonstration of the utility of information theoretic secu-
rity concepts in securing state of the art wireless networks.
In our opinion, the success of such concepts in practice will
depend critically on the ability to apply them to complement
existing security mechanisms rather than replacing them. We
hope that this first step will stimulate further work aiming at
bridging the gap between the two worlds.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
A. Achievability Proof
The proof is given for a fixed average power P ≤ P¯
and transmission rate R0. The key rate is then obtained by
the appropriate maximization. Let Rs = C(g)s − δ for some
small δ > 0 and R = R0 − . We first generate all binary
sequences {V} of length mR and then independently assign
each of them randomly to one of 2nRs groups, according to
a uniform distribution. This ensures that any of the sequences
are equally likely to be within any of the groups. Each secret
message w ∈ {1, · · · , 2nRs} is then assigned a group V(w).
We then generate a Gaussian codebook consisting of 2n1(R0−)
codewords, each of length n1 symbols. The codebooks are then
revealed to Alice, Bob, and Eve. To transmit the codeword,
Alice first selects a random group v(i) of n1R bits, and then
transmits the corresponding codeword, drawn from the chosen
Gaussian codebook. If Alice receives an ACK bit from Bob,
both are going to store this group of bits and selects another
group of bits to send in the next coherence interval in the
same manner. If a NACK was received, this group of bits is
discarded and another is generated in the same manner. This
process is repeated till both Alice and Bob have shared the
same key w corresponding to nRs bits. We observe that the
channel coding theorem implies the existence of a Gaussian
codebook where the fraction of successfully decoded frames
is given by m
n
= Pr (R0 ≤ log2 (1 + hbP )) , as n1 → ∞.
The equivocation rate at the eavesdropper can then be lower
bounded as follows.
nRe = H
(
W |Zn,Kb, Gbb, Gbe
)
(a)
= H (W |Zm, Gab , Gae)
= H (W,Zm|Gab , Gae)−H (Zm|Gab , Gae)
= H (W,Zm, Xm|Gab , Gae)−H (Zm|Gab , Gae)
−H (Xm|W,Zm, Gab , Gae)
= H (Xm|Gab , Gae) +H (W,Zm|Xm, Gab , Gae)
−H (Zm|Gab , Gae)−H (Xm|W,Zm, Gab , Gae)
≥ H (Xm|Gab , Gae) +H (Zm|Xm, Gab , Gae)
−H (Zm|Gab , Gae)−H (Xm|W,Zm, Gab , Gae)
= H (Xm|Gab , Gae)− I (Zm;Xm|Gab , Gae)
−H (Xm|W,Zm, Gab , Gae)
= H (Xm|Zm, Gab , Gae)−H (Xm|W,Zm, Gab , Gae)
(b)
=
a∑
j=1
H (X(j)|Z(j), Gb(j), Ge(j))
−H (Xm|W,Zm, Gab , Gae)
(c)
≥
∑
j∈Nm
H (X(j)|Z(j), Gb(j), Ge(j))
−H (Xm|W,Zm, Gab , Gae)
=
∑
j∈Nm
[
H (X(j)|Gb(j), Ge(j))
− I (X(j);Z(j)|Gb(j), Ge(j))
]
−H (Xm|W,Zm, Gab , Gae)
≥
∑
j∈Nm
n1
[
R0 − log2 (1 + he(j)P )− 
]
−H (Xm|W,Zm, Gab , Gae)
≥
a∑
j=1
n1
{
[R0 − log2 (1 + he(j)P )]+ − 
}
−H (Xm|W,Zm, Gab , Gae)
(d)
= nC(g)s −H (Xm|W,Zm, Gab , Gae)−m. (16)
In the above derivation, (a) results from the independent choice
of the codeword symbols transmitted in each ARQ frame
which does not allow Eve to benefit from the observations
corresponding to the NACKed frames, (b) follows from the
memoryless property of the channel and the independence
of the X(j)’s, (c) is obtained by removing all those terms
which correspond to the coherence intervals j /∈ Nm, where
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Nm = {j ∈ {1, · · · , a} : hb(j) > he(j)|ψ = 1}, where ψ is
a binary random variable and ψ = 1 indicates that an
ACK was received, and (d) follows from the ergodicity of
the channel as n,m → ∞. Now we show that the term
H(Xm|W,Zm, Gab , Gae) vanishes as n1 → ∞ by using a list
decoding argument. In this list decoding, at coherence interval
j, the wiretapper first constructs a list Lj such that x(j) ∈ Lj
if (x(i), z(i)) are jointly typical. Let L = L1×L2×· · ·×La.
Given w, the wiretapper declares that xˆm = (xm) was trans-
mitted, if xˆm is the only codeword such that xˆm ∈ B(w)∩L,
where B(w) is the set of codewords corresponding to the
message w. If the wiretapper finds none or more than one such
sequence, then it declares an error. Hence, there are two types
of error events: 1) E1: the transmitted codeword xmt is not in
L, 2) E2: ∃xm 6= xmt such that xm ∈ B(w)∩L. Thus the error
probability Pr(xˆm 6= xmt ) = Pr(E1 ∪ E2) ≤ Pr(E1) + Pr(E2).
Based on the Asymptotic Equipartition Property (AEP), we
know that Pr(E1) ≤ 1. In order to bound Pr(E2), we first
bound the size of Lj . We let
φj(x(j)|z(j)) =
{
1, (x(j), z(j)) are jointly typical,
0, otherwise.
Now
E{‖Lj‖} = E


∑
x(j)
φj(x(j)|z(j))


≤ E

1 +
∑
x(j) 6=xt(j)
φj(x(j)|z(j))


≤ 1 +
∑
x(j) 6=xt(j)
E {φj(x(j)|z(j))}
≤ 1 + 2n1[R0−log2(1+he(j)P )−]
≤ 2n1
(
[R0−log2(1+he(j)P )−]
++ 1
n1
)
.
Hence
E{‖L‖} =
a∏
j=1
{‖Lj‖}
= 2
a∑
j=1
n1
(
[R0−log2(1+hE(j)P )−]
++ 1
n1
)
.
Pr(E2) ≤ E


∑
xm∈L,xm 6=xmt
Pr(xm ∈ B(w))


(a)
≤ E{‖L‖2−nRs}
≤ 2−nRs2
a∑
j=1
n1
(
[R0−log2(1+he(j)P )−]
++ 1
n1
)
≤ 2
−n
(
Rs−
1
c
a∑
j=1
(
[R0−log2(1+he(j)P )−]
++ 1
n1
))
= 2
−n
(
Rs−
1
c
a∑
j=1
(
[R0−log2(1+he(j)P )]
++ 1
n1
)
+
|Nm|
c
)
,
where (a) follows from the uniform distribution of the code-
words in B(w). Now as n1 →∞ and a→∞, we get
Pr(E2) ≤ 2−n(C
(g)
s −δ−C
(g)
s +a) = 2−n(c−δ),
where c = Pr(hb > he). Thus, by choosing  > (δ/c), the
error probability Pr(E2) → 0 as n → ∞. Now using Fano’s
inequality, we get H(Xm|W,Zm, Gab , Gae) ≤ nδn → 0 as
m,n → ∞. Combining this with (16), we get the desired
result.
B. Converse Proof
We now prove the converse part by showing that for any
perfect secrecy rate Rs with equivocation rate Re > Rs − 
as n,m→∞, there exists a transmission rate R0, such that
Rs ≤ E
{
[R0 − log2 (1 + heP )]+
I (R0 ≤ log2 (1 + hbP ))
}
.
Consider any sequence of (2nRs ,m) codes with per-
fect secrecy rate Rs and equivocation rate Re, such that
Re > Rs −  as n → ∞. We note that the equivocation
H(W |Zn,Kn, Gbb, Gbe) only depends on the marginal distri-
bution of Zn, and thus does not depend on whether Z(i) is a
physically or stochastically degraded version of Y (i) or vice
versa. Hence we assume in the following derivation that for
any fading state, either Z(i) is a physically degraded version
of Y (i) or vice versa (since the noise processes are Gaussian).
Thus we have
nRe = H(W |Zb,Kn, Gbb, Gbe)
(a)
= H(W |Zm, Gab , Gae)
(b)
≤ H(W |Zm, Gab , Gae)−H(W |Zm, Y m, Gab , Gae)
+mδm
= I(W ;Y m|Zm, Gab , Gae) +mδn
(c)
≤ I(Xm;Y m|Zm, Gab , Gae) +mδm
= H(Y m|Zm, Gab , Gae)
−H(Y m|Xm, Zm, Gab , Gae) +mδm
=
a∑
i=1
[H(Y (i)|Y i−1, Zm, Gab , Gae)
−H(Y (i)|Y i−1, Xm, Zm, Gab , Gae)] +mδm
(d)
≤
a∑
i=1
[H(Y (i)|Z(i), Gb(i), Ge(i)
−H(Y (i)|X(i), Z(i), Gb(i), Ge(i))] +mδm
=
a∑
i=1
I(X(i);Y (i)|Z(i), Gb(i), Ge(i)) +mδm
(e)
=
a∑
i=1
I(X(i);Y (i)|Gb(i), Ge(i))
− I(X(i);Z(i)|Gb(i), Ge(i)) +mδm
≤
a∑
i=1
R0 − log2(1 + he(i)P ) +mδm
≤
a∑
i=1
[R0 − log2(1 + he(i)P )]+ +mδm
Re
(f)
≤ E{ [R0 − log2 (1 + heP )]+
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I (R0 ≤ log2 (1 + hbP ))
}
+ βδm,
where β = Pr(R0 ≤ log2(1 + hbP )). In the above derivation,
(a) results from the independent choice of the codeword
symbols transmitted in each ARQ frame which does not
allow Eve to benefit from the observations corresponding
to the NACKed frames, (b) follows from Fano’s inequal-
ity, (c) follows from the data processing inequality since
W → Xm → (Y m, Zm) forms a Markov chain, (d) follows
from the fact that conditioning reduces entropy and from the
memoryless property of the channel, (e) follows from the fact
that I(X ;Y |Z) = I(X ;Y ) − I(X ;Z) as shown in [1], (f)
follows from ergodicity of the channel as m,n → ∞. The
claim is thus proved.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF DECORRELATION
In this appendix, we show that employing multiple transmit
antennas makes the correlation between Eve’s and Bob’s
channel power gains converge to zero, in a mean-square sense,
as the number of antennas N goes to ∞. Let l1 = |geqb |2 and
l2 = |geqe |2. Assuming all θ’s to be uniformly distributed in
the interval [−pi, pi], we get,
l1 =
1
N


∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
cos (θiR + θiB)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
+
∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
sin (θiR + θiB)
∣∣∣∣∣
2


=
1
N
[
N + 2
N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
{
cos (θiR + θiB) cos (θjR + θjB)
+ sin (θiR + θiB) sin (θjR + θjB)
}]
= 1 +
2
N
N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
cos (θiR + θiB − θjR − θjB) . (17)
Similarly for l2,
l2 = 1 +
2
N
N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
cos (θiR + θiE − θjR − θjE) . (18)
Now, taking the expectation of (17) and (18) with respect to the
random phases applied on the transmit antenna array θiR for
given values of θiE ’s and θiB’s, we get E (l1) = E (l2) = 1,
and
E (l1) = E (l2) = 1,
E (l1l2) = 1 +
2
N2
N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
cos [(θiB − θiE)− (θjB − θjE)] ,
E
(
l21
)
= E
(
l22
)
= 1 +
2
N2
N(N − 1)
2
= 1 +
N − 1
N
.
So, the variance of l1 and l2 is given by
var (l1) = var (l2) = σ
2
l1
= σ2l2 =
N − 1
N
.
Therefore, the correlation coefficient ρ between the channels’
power gains is given by
ρ =
E (l1l2)− E (l1)E (l2)√
var (l1)
√
V ar (l2)
=
2
N(N − 1)
N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
cos [(θiB − θiE)− (θjB − θjE)]
=
2
N(N − 1)
N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
cos [∆i −∆j ] ,
where ∆i = θiB − θiE and ∆j = θjB − θjE . Assuming
θiB, θiE , θjB , θjE are all independent, and uniformly dis-
tributed in the interval [−pi, pi], and taking the expectation of
ρ over them, we get
E (ρ) = 0. (19)
The divergence of ρ around its mean is given by
var(ρ) = σ2
=
4
N2(N − 1)2
N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
var (cos (∆i −∆j))
=
4
N2(N − 1)2 .
N(N − 1)
2
.
1
2
=
1
N(N − 1) . (20)
Thus, the standard deviation of ρ is given by σ = 1√
N(N−1)
'
1
N
. It is evident from (20) that var(ρ) goes to zero as N →∞.
That is, the correlation coefficient ρ converges, in a mean-
square sense, to zero.
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